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OPINION OF THE COURT 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 This case is before us on remand from the Supreme Court 
which vacated our order affirming the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to the defendant-appellees David Owens, Irene 
Pernsley, Gaetano Curione and Harry Moore in the suit filed by 
Derrick Dale Fontroy. 
I. 
 The case began in August 1986 when Fontroy, a prisoner 
at the Holmesburg Prison in Philadelphia, filed a pro se claim 
against David Owens, Superintendent of the Philadelphia Prison 
System, alleging a variety of unconstitutional conditions of 
confinement, including the claim that he was surrounded by 
asbestos.  Defendant Owens filed a motion to dismiss the first 
amended complaint, which the district court denied insofar as it 
pertained to the plaintiff's allegation of asbestos problems in 
his cell.  The district court ruled that this allegation stated 
an Eighth Amendment claim because "[d]angerous exposure to 
asbestos caused by defendant's deliberate indifference could 
deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's 
necessities, i.e. habitable shelter."  App. at 63.   
 Counsel was appointed for plaintiff in November 1988. A 
Second Amended Complaint, filed in June 1989, added the three 
other defendant officials and refined the asbestos allegations to 
read: 
14.  During the entire period of time which Plaintiff 
spent in D Rear, he was surrounded by the known 
carcinogenic, asbestos, which was loosely wrapped 
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around pipes and visibly present in the walls and 
ceilings of both the D Rear cells and common area, and 
to which Plaintiff was constantly exposed. 
 . . . 
16.  As a direct result of Plaintiff's constant, 
unreasonable and unnecessary exposure to asbestos in 
his place of confinement, Plaintiff was caused to 
suffer various injuries to his mind and body, all of 
which injuries will probably be permanent in nature and 
have in the past, and will in the future cause 
Plaintiff to suffer great pain and suffering, physical 
pain, mental anguish, extreme fright, embarrassment and 
humiliation, anxiety, depression and loss of life's 
pleasures. 
 . . . 
24.  At all times material, there existed a regular, 
frequent, and continuous pattern of incidents which 
exposed Plaintiff to a pervasive risk of harm . . . 
from exposure to asbestos in deprivation of his civil 
rights . . . .   
 
App. at 69, 71. 
 Defendants denied the allegations and moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that "mere exposure to asbestos is not a 
condition that can be said to be cruel and unusual" and that 
there were no facts "that support the allegation that asbestos is 
present in Holmesburg."  App. at 89, 90.   
 In his Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment, Fontroy argued that "[a]ssuming that [the cases cited 
by the defendants] hold that a civil rights plaintiff cannot 
prevail on a claim of mere exposure to asbestos, this case is 
distinguishable.  Plaintiff here claims an injury; a claim which 
Defendants have not disproved."  App. at 117.  Fontroy then 
attempted in a footnote to distinguish cases cited by the 
defendants: 
Defendants maintain these decisions collectively hold 
that an inmate's exposure to asbestos does not 
constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment 
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. 
4 
Contrary to Defendants' broad interpretation, Plaintiff 
asserts the cases stand for the narrow proposition that 
prisoner lawsuits based on the 8th Amendment will not 
be permitted when there is mere exposure to asbestos. 
Thus, there can be no judicial remedy for the enhanced 
risk of future harm from mere exposure, but a litigant 
could recover if the exposure results in the 
manifestation of physical injury. 
 
App. at 117 n.3. 
 
 Fontroy also argued that "[b]ecause Defendants have 
failed to disprove the presence of asbestos at the prison, there 
remains a material fact in issue."  App. at 118. 
 The district court granted summary judgment, finding 
that an x-ray showed plaintiff was not suffering from any 
diseases linked to the exposure to asbestos.  The court concluded 
that "[w]ithout evidence of injury related to exposure to 
asbestos, there is no genuine issue of material fact pertaining 
to plaintiff's asbestos claims.  Plaintiff's assertions that 
genuine issues remain because defendants had not deposed or 
examined the plaintiff, and have not disproved the presence of 
asbestos at the prison are moot in light of the absence of 
evidence that plaintiff suffers from any harmful effects of 
asbestos exposure."  App. at 135 (citations and footnote 
omitted). 
 We affirmed the district court's order by a judgment 
order on February 25, 1993.  See Fontroy v. Owens, 989 F.2d 486 
(3d Cir. 1993).  On June 18, 1993, the Supreme Court issued its 
opinion in Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2481 (1993), 
which held that a prisoner "states a cause of action under the 
Eighth Amendment by alleging that petitioners have, with 
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deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of [environmental 
tobacco smoke] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage 
to his future health."   
 In August 1993, Fontroy filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari.  See 62 U.S.L.W. 3165 (U.S. Aug. 23, 1993) (No. 93-
281).  One of the three questions presented was whether our 
decision, described by the plaintiff as holding "that [an] 
inmate's involuntary exposure to asbestos does not raise an 
Eighth Amendment claim absent present injury," was contrary to 
Helling.  62 U.S.L.W. 3201 (1993).  On January 10, 1994, the 
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, vacated our judgment, 
and remanded "for further consideration in light of Helling v. 
McKinney."  114 S. Ct. 671, 672 (1994). 
II. 
 After receiving the Court's mandate, we requested both 
parties to submit legal memoranda stating what actions they 
believed to be appropriate.
1
  Fontroy suggests that we reverse 
the summary judgment order and remand for further discovery and 
trial.  He argues that the district court's summary judgment 
ruling was premised on the theory that since there was "no 
current damage to the lungs, . . . no cause of action exists," 
                     
1
We also received Fontroy's unsolicited response to the 
defendants' memorandum and defendants' motion to strike the 
response, which we deny herewith although we do not take 
cognizance of documents submitted that were not in the record. 
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Memorandum on Remand at 6 n.7, and that Helling overruled this 
legal theory by holding that an unreasonable risk of injury is 
sufficient to state a claim. 
 We do not understand the defendants to dispute that 
Helling permits a plaintiff to proceed on a cause of action 
alleging an unreasonable risk of future injury from present 
exposure to asbestos.  Nor can they reasonably dispute that 
portions of Fontroy's complaint can be fairly construed to state 
such a claim.  See App. at 69, 71 (¶¶ 14, 16, 24).   
 They argue, instead, that in the procedural posture of 
this case, Fontroy cannot pursue such a challenge because he 
specifically abandoned such a claim in his Memorandum of Law in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment.  See App. at 117 & n.3.  In 
addition, they claim that Fontroy's failure to point to anything 
in the record (besides his complaint) which suggests that he was 
exposed to asbestos at all is a sufficient and independent ground 
for granting summary judgment.
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 Fontroy responds that the Supreme Court decided the 
waiver argument by vacating and remanding the case.  We do not 
construe the Supreme Court's instruction to give the case 
"further consideration in light of Helling," as deciding the 
waiver issue.  There is no basis to assume that the Supreme Court 
made any determination relevant to the merits of Fontroy's case. 
                     
2
In his response, Fontroy submitted various documents which he 
claims show that there was asbestos in many areas of the prison. 
Even if we could consider these documents, they do not reach the 
question of whether there was evidence in the record before the 
district court that demonstrated Fontroy was exposed to asbestos. 
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We have previously stated that "[w]e know of no authority for the 
proposition that a direction that we give 'further consideration' 
to a case is in effect a direction as to the outcome.  If the 
Supreme Court wished to direct an outcome, we are confident that 
it would have so stated."  Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 
882 F.2d 720, 721 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 
(1990). 
 Whether that issue was indeed waived by the plaintiff 
is a fact-based inquiry in these circumstances most appropriate 
for consideration by the district court which can, if necessary, 
hold any necessary hearings relating thereto.  Thus we will 
remand to the district court to determine whether summary 
judgment would still be appropriate, either because Fontroy 
waived the legal theory on which his remaining claim rests, the 
record is barren of any evidence of the presence of asbestos, or 
otherwise.  If not, the district court should proceed with the 
case on the merits.  In that connection we note from the record 
that Fontroy was transferred from the prison in question while 
this case was still pending in the district court.  The Helling 
opinion notes that the petitioner sought both injunctive relief, 
i.e. a non-smoking cellmate, and damages, but it appears the 
primary focus was on the injunction.  Thus the Supreme Court did 
not have occasion to comment on the request for damages by a 
plaintiff who alleged only risk of future injury.  That issue may 
arise in this case, and if so we leave it for the district 
court's consideration in the first instance. 
III. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order of 
the district court granting summary judgment and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Appeal costs to be 
assessed against appellees. 
 
                            
 
  
